Donald Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States has sent ripples through the international system that took shape after World War II, touching politics, economics, security, and culture. Climate governance has not been spared. Instead, it now sits inside a broader, unsettled reshuffling of norms and expectations, leaving the path ahead clouded by doubt and competing assumptions about what rules will hold and which ones will bend.
That uncertainty is amplified by Trump’s long-standing posture toward climate change. He has repeatedly cast doubt on the reality and severity of the problem and has pushed back against policies designed to cut emissions or strengthen resilience to climate impacts. During his earlier term, the United States exited the Paris Agreement, and the possibility of another step back—from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change—now hangs over diplomats and negotiators as a real prospect rather than a distant theory.
The practical meaning of this shift is not confined to speeches or symbolism. Under Trump’s leadership, climate-related rollbacks have tended to move from intention to execution, with reversals of prior regulations, pauses or cancellations of research efforts, and the elevation of officials who resist or dismiss mainstream climate science. That approach has historically created more room for traditional fossil fuel development and slowed the policy momentum that many countries had come to treat as a baseline expectation from Washington.
When the United States Steps Away
The sense of déjà vu is hard to ignore for observers who recall the moment in 2016 when climate delegates gathered in Marrakech for the 22nd Conference of the Parties to the UN climate convention. As the Paris Agreement’s early conference process was just getting underway, Trump announced the United States would withdraw from the deal, disrupting not only the negotiations but also the psychological anchor that U.S. participation provides in global efforts.
By late 2025, the United Nations Environment Programme’s “Emissions Gap Report 2024,” framed around the message “No More Hot Air… Please!,” underscored the distance between what governments say and what they do. The report’s call for strengthened commitments landed in a world already frustrated by performative climate pledges. Under Trump’s return, the worry is sharper: the United States may not even offer the rhetoric that often precedes action, because earlier commitments could again be treated as disposable.
From there, the hardest questions emerge. If the United States, given its influence and emissions profile, chooses not to participate meaningfully, can the result still be described as truly global climate governance? Even if other nations continue their work, the absence of a major emitter and economic power changes the character of the enterprise, turning what is meant to be universal coordination into a patchwork of coalitions trying to compensate for a missing center of gravity.
This tension is clearer when contrasted with the prior administration’s trajectory. The Biden administration positioned climate action as a central national objective, aiming to cut U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 40% below 2005 levels by 2030 and to reach net-zero by 2050, while linking those goals to roughly 2 trillion dollars in planned infrastructure and clean energy investment. That directionality mattered internationally because it signaled policy continuity over multiple years—an ingredient that climate governance depends on to function.
Fraying Trust, Yet Not the End
Much of the U.S. plan rested on the Inflation Reduction Act, passed in 2022 as the most consequential climate legislation in American history. Implementation details, such as which electric vehicles would qualify for consumer subsidies, arrived later, with key rules released on April 1, 2024. Yet the likelihood that those rules would be carried forward under a Trump administration is doubtful, and the probability that remaining IRA funds would be distributed as originally envisioned appears low.
Momentum built in the private sector may also struggle to hold. The National Clean Energy Council reported that between August 2022 and August 2023, the U.S. private sector created 80 large clean energy facilities with investment exceeding 270 billion dollars. A change in federal posture can chill investment, slow permitting or incentives, and weaken the long-term certainty that large-scale energy projects require. At the same time, Trump’s tendency to lean on tariffs raises fears that trade policy could spill into climate outcomes far beyond U.S. borders.
Those spillovers are not theoretical in the text at hand. Studies cited there indicate that tariffs on solar panels, wind turbine components, and battery storage systems have disrupted supply chains and raised costs for clean energy technologies globally. The same approach is described as likely to constrain Chinese investment tied to electric vehicles produced in Mexico, adding another layer of friction to already complex cross-border transitions. In climate governance, where speed and affordability shape success, added cost and uncertainty can translate into lost time.
Perhaps the deeper damage, though, is to trust. Climate action is a collective endeavor that relies on consultation, compromise, and the belief that major actors will not abruptly reverse course. Trump’s stance and history on climate policy have already strained that confidence, and further volatility in U.S. climate diplomacy would likely deepen skepticism among partners who need predictability to justify difficult domestic choices.
Signs of that erosion are already noted. The European Union has opted to delay the rollout of certain ESG-related regulations, and Indonesia has signaled it may revisit its trajectory for meeting Paris Agreement obligations. These moves, as presented, reflect not only policy calculations but also a recalibration of expectations—what countries think others will do, and therefore what they feel safe committing to themselves.
Still, the article’s message is not that climate governance has reached a dead end. It argues there is room for hope, grounded in three realities: the United States matters immensely, but it is not the only pillar; the U.S. president influences policy profoundly, but does not control every force shaping climate action; and cooperation among major blocs remains possible, including between China and the United States, China and Europe, and the United States and Europe.
Inside the United States, the text points to climate-engaged actors that operate beyond partisan cycles: private sector leaders, technology companies, and citizens who prioritize environmental protection and remain concerned about climate risks. Those forces can sustain progress even when federal leadership changes, keeping elements of the transition alive in boardrooms, labs, and local initiatives.
From China’s perspective, the piece closes by insisting that difficult times do not eliminate future possibility. It states China will continue its approach to climate governance through the lens of building a community with a shared future for humanity, emphasizing emissions reduction, mitigation, and adaptation. It reiterates commitments to ecological civilization and a “beautiful China,” and it frames China’s role as cooperative—working with all parties worldwide to contribute constructively to addressing the climate crisis.
