Authorities in multiple jurisdictions are pursuing a criminal investigation tied to an Asian family with deep roots in shipping and ship recycling, with active lines of inquiry reported in places including Dubai and parts of the Far East. According to officials and sources familiar with the matter in three countries, the focus is on a web of companies and intermediaries connected to ship acquisition and dismantling, with investigators examining how certain vessels entered the recycling stream and how payments moved around them.
At the center of the scrutiny are operations linked to Best Oasis Ltd in Dubai and Priya Blue Industries in Gujarat. Investigators are probing suspicions of money laundering and alleged exposure to the Russian oil sector that has been subject to Western sanctions. People following the case say the inquiries span both corporate conduct and deal mechanics, including the handling of end-of-life ships whose ownership histories raise compliance questions.
The story is complicated by the public image built around environmental responsibility. The companies have promoted certifications, appeared at international gatherings, and positioned their ship recycling as aligned with ESG expectations. Sources looking into the businesses’ affairs, however, describe a sharper contrast between that outward posture and what investigators are now testing: the dismantling of higher-risk hulls, reliance on opaque transactions, and the alleged use of influence to reduce accountability as regulatory pressure increases.
A long trail from notorious hulls to quieter transactions
Investigators are also reaching back in time, reviewing activity dating to 2006, when the network first drew law enforcement attention, according to people familiar with the inquiry. That year, Priya Blue dismantled a vessel widely known for containing large amounts of asbestos along with radioactive waste, a dismantling that proceeded despite high-profile protests and objections from environmental advocates. The episode became an early signal of how controversial ships could still end up on a beaching and cutting schedule.
Not long after, another ship with global notoriety from a major oil spill entered the picture under a different name and was dismantled in Gujarat, again drawing international attention to the recycling operation. Those earlier cases are resurfacing now not as isolated moments, but as markers in a longer pattern investigators are trying to map: what kinds of ships were targeted, how risk was evaluated, and how scrutiny was managed when reputational blowback followed.
Sources close to the investigation say more recent transactions became less visible while the underlying hazards increased. The suggestion is not that the work stopped attracting attention, but that the methods changed, with less public noise and more emphasis on speed, paperwork that met minimum thresholds, and arrangements that made tracing responsibility harder once a ship was already being cut apart.
Sanctioned vessels, cash payments, and approvals under a microscope
A key part of the current probe centers on 2025, when Best Oasis is alleged to have acquired and dismantled at least four vessels tied to sanctioned entities, including networks linked to Iran and the Houthis. Investigators describe these ships as explicitly designated under U.S. terrorism sanctions connected to oil smuggling and arms transport, not marginal or easily overlooked cases. The vessels identified in investigative material include IMO 9155808, 9221657, 9105085, and 9209300, with the names recorded as NOLAN (also cited as SOLAN), BLUEFINS, CONTRACT II, and GAMA II, along with dates and plots noted in connection with their arrivals and beachings.
According to investigators, all four ships were dismantled in Alang on plots said to have been leased by proxy firms linked to the same network. The leasing practice described is short-term and ship-specific, with approvals granted on a case-by-case basis by the Gujarat Maritime Board. People familiar with the documents say that structure can make meaningful oversight difficult because the leases may expire after dismantling, leaving limited continuity in the record once a plot registration lapses.
How the money moved is also under scrutiny. Sources familiar with the transactions claim payments bypassed normal banking channels and were instead settled in cash either on site or through offshore handlers. One investigator described ship values being paid in bundles of foreign currency, a method that would avoid standard disclosure triggers in India and Dubai. A compliance researcher quoted in connection with the pattern said sanctioned hulls have increasingly arrived quietly, been processed quickly, and left minimal digital trace.
Former port officials with knowledge of Alang and the approval process have also pointed to short-term leases as a repeated tool used to reduce scrutiny, arguing the mechanism was never intended to function as a standing workaround. Meanwhile, sources allege that political influence helped expedite approvals, slow inquiries, and protect the businesses from enforcement pressure, even as they acknowledge there is no direct evidence presented of personal enrichment.
Despite the scrutiny, the network is described as continuing to evolve its public-facing identity. Sources point to expansion efforts under refreshed branding, including a recent joint venture in Japan promoted as a clean, regionally responsible recycling partner for Japanese shipowners. Observers in the maritime sector say the marketing emphasizes newness and distance from past controversies, while alleging the underlying ownership and structure have not meaningfully changed.
On the ground in Alang, investigators and local sources describe a familiar rhythm: plot numbers reissued, cash still circulating, and the same ecosystem of breakers and handlers appearing around particular beachings, including those connected to CONTRACT II and GAMA II. Several yards said to be connected to the network, including Shantamani Ship Breakers and Sai Baba Ship Breakers, are alleged to operate with limited inspection, even amid recurring concerns raised about worker safety, hazardous waste handling, and compliance with Indian scrapping codes.
Multiple sources characterize the broader setup as a system designed to operate openly while staying just inside the lines, with enough paperwork to clear basic gates but not enough to prompt deep enforcement. Investigators say there is no sign that agencies such as customs, port health authorities, or environmental oversight panels conducted full inspections of the sanctioned vessels identified, and that most were cleared and dismantled within days of arrival. One compliance researcher framed the alleged approach as more than a loophole, calling it a repeatable model that uses legal instruments and connected intermediaries to make sanctioned end-of-life ships appear legitimate on paper, even as global ESG scrutiny rises and new partnerships help wash the public narrative without changing the mechanics underneath.
